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I am glad to have this opportunity 'iO 
speak on the psychiatric aspects because I 
feel that I have something to say which 
needs to be said. But let me explain at the 
very outset that my main object in pre-
senting these! comments is to contriJute 
towards restricting the areas of misunder-
standilng which sometimes aris~ between 
the judicature and the psychiatrist. 
Probi~msl of forensic psychi.atry af\8 
the most complex because of the very 
nature of the field of study. For here we 
are concerned not with fixed anatomical 
structures or phy~holog)ical functions but 
with all the vagaries of human conduct 
and behaviour, both normal and abnor-
mal. 
This is indeed a very vast subject 
which cannot be condensed in a brief in-
troduction without creating mental con-
fusion. It is for this reason that I have 
chosen just one of the most outstanding 
problems of forensic psychiatry which is 
the issue of insanity as a defence in 
crimina,l law. The legaJ issues involved in 
determindng responsibility. in convicting 
and in sentencing have corresponding 
medical issues in the diagnosis, care and 
treatment of the abnorm,U offender and 
it is in this area that mutual understanding 
and cooperation between law and medicine 
present the greatest challenge. 
Crimine! Responsibility 
It is a fundamental doctrine of crimi-
nal Jaw that if a man is sane he is respon-
sible for his criminal acts and if insane 
he is not responsio,le, In Malta this 
doctrine is entrenched in Sec. 34 of the 
Criminal Code which states as foHows: 
"Every person is exempt from criminal 
responsibility if at the time of the act or 
omission complained of such person (a) 
was in a state of insanity or frenzy." This 
is in line with the provisions: of the Crimi-
nal Code of various European countries. 
Pasquale T'uozzi in his book "Corso di 
DkiUo Pena,le" traces the developmental 
stages of the concept of culpability and 
responsibi,lity from the Sardinian Code of 
1859 to the present Sec 46 of the Italian 
Penal Code. The relevant section (Sec 94) 
in the "Codice Sardo" states: "Non vi e 
reato se l'imputato trovasi in stato di asso-
luta imbecillita, di pazzia 0 di morboso 
furore quando commise I'azione." ("There 
is no c:r:iminal offence if the accused was 
in a state of complete imbedlity, insanity 
or morbid frenzy when he committed the 
act"). The correspond'jng section ,in our 
criminal code is practicaJly identica:l with 
the Sardinian code except that it did not 
include imbecility or mental subnormality 
as it is now known. According to Tuozzi 
this section in the Sardinian code was 
thought to be too restpiotive in its applica-
tion. The concept was therefore expanded 
to embrace a wider category of abnormal 
mental conditions and to define the terms 
in law which determine responsibility. 
The present Sec 46 of the Itahan Penal 
Code :states: "Non e punibHe colui che nel 
momento in cui ha commesso· i1 fatto era 
in tale stato di inf'ermita di mente da 
,togliergli la coscienza 0 la liberta dei pro-
pri atti." (No person is liable to punish-
ment who at the time when he committed 
the act was in such a state of mental 
infirmity as to be deprived of conscious-
ness or of freedom of action). The concept 
of "Infermita di mente" encompasses a, 
vaster field than the concept of insanity. 
The I taHan code defines the two ingre-
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dients for determining criminal responsi-
bility namely intelligence, knowledge and 
awareness of the act or omission and 
volition including freedom of choice. 
In Malta we have no legal definition 
of insanity or frenzy but the mental attri-
butes which exempt a crtminal offender 
from plnishment are contained in Sec 35 
which deals with intoxication and was 
amended as recently as 1956 by Act 5 
and now reads as follows: "Intoxication 
shall be a defence to any criminal charge 
if by reason thereof the person charged 
at the time of the act or omission com-
plained of was incapable of understanding 
and volition, etc. This makes the Jegal 
test of culpability and responsibility in 
Ma>lta: dependent on the same mental attri-
butes applicable to the Italian and other 
European penal codes. 
In England the legal test of insanity 
is based on the McNaughten rules which 
state that in order to be acquitted of cri-
minal responsibility by reason of insanity 
it must be proved that the accused was 
saffering from a defect of reason due to 
disease of the mind such that (a~ he did 
not know the nature and quality of his 
act ~b) that he did not know that he was 
doing wrong -and the word "wrong" in 
England means wrong in l,a,w and not 
morally wrong and, (c) that the disease of 
the mind resulted in a delusion which if 
true would have justified the accused 
doing what he did. 
The McNaughten rules put all the 
emphasis on reason, 'knowledge and un-
derstanding of the nature of the act and 
of its iUegality and do not take into 
account the concept of volition or the 
impairment of the ability to control con-
duct. Even "the de,lusion clause depends on 
reason and understanding. The iaw 
accepts the delusion b:lt reqaires the 
accused to reason about it as a sane man. 
As an American Judge PUlt ilt, the prisoner 
must not only be mad but must use suffi-
cient reason in his madness so as to tailor 
his criminal action to fit his delusion. It 
has been rightly said that nobody is hardly 
ever mad enough to be within the defini-
tion of the· law (Baron Bramwell) and 
most psychiiMric offenders evaded convic-
tion because the rules were stretched and 
interpreted in a charitable way. 
In comparatively recent times an 
attempt to break the rigid distinction 
between McNaiUghten insanity and fuU 
responsibility had been made throJ:gh the 
introduction of the doctrine of the Irresis-
t~ble Impulse and that of Diminished 
Responsibility. In many American states 
as well as in Scotland the right or wrong 
test of the McNaughten rules has been 
supplemented by the doctrine of the 
Irresistibl:e Impulse which is based on the 
assumption that men can make a delibe-
rate choice to act or refrain from acting 
but that insanity can give rise to impulses 
which cannot be resisted; but whether an 
impTlse is truly irresistible or has not 
been resisted cannot be scientificany 
proved. It is not a distinction that anybody 
can make about ianybody else. 
English law does not recognise the 
irresistible impulse as a. defence. The 
passing of the HomiCide Act 1957 how-
ever introduced the doctrine of diminished 
responsibility and Sec 2 of the act reduces 
guilt from one of murder to manslaughter 
if an abnormality of the mind substantially 
impairs the accused's responsibiUty for his 
acts. 
Legal and medical concepts of 
mental disorder 
The legal concept of mental disorder 
is at variance with modern psychological 
and psychiatric concepts and the attempts 
to keep notions of culpability in step with 
the growth of medical knowledge does not 
seem to have produced the desired 
result. 
In practice there lare two fundamental 
issues in which psychiatry cannot satisfy 
the demands of legal principles governing 
c:llpabi.lity and responsibility. One is the 
concept which views individual char-
acteristicsas falling into distinct classes 
rather than continuous scales, and the 
other is the concept which views the mind 
as composed of separate ,and distinct 
fwnctions or faculties rather than a 
number of interdependent ones. 
In psychiatry, as in a,u biological 
sciences we learn to think in terms of 
continuous soaJes rather than clear cut 
classes. In all biological variables there is 
a continuum between two extremes. We 
do not classifly human beings on an 
either/or basis as. ta·ll or short, thin or 
fiat, idiots or geniuses, sane or insane. Just 
as there is a continuOilS scale for height 
and a continuous scale for weight so one 
finds all shades and gradations from idiocy 
at one extreme to genius laJt the other and 
from the well adjusted to the raving psy-
chotic. Some psychiatrists have in fact 
today come out with the theory of a con-
tinuum of deviation from a normality 
which shade~ grlaJdual'ly, into psychoneu-
roses and psychoneurosis shading gra-
dually into psychosis. 
The ~aw in its doctru1ne of cl~lm;nar 
responsibility shows Utile respect for this 
concept of a continuum of deviation. The 
traditiona~ legal view works in terms of 
black or white whereas as one author puts 
it "the minds of men are shades of grey." 
Indeed one of the most frustraJting 
experiences of many expert witnesses is 
that court officials demand impossible yes 
or no answers to' their questions and 
ignore all the uncertainties and all the 
ambiguities of behaviour which we as 
psychiCl!trists have learned to accept in 
practice. 
Today it is well recognised that there 
is no 'cl~ar-cliit line, hietwe'en the legail:ly 
sane and the legally insane. Between these 
two extremes there 'are many so called 
twHi:ght conditions which are not serious 
enough for an accused to be acquitted of 
criminal responsibility under the present 
tests nor to require that he be indetermin-
ately confined to a mental hospita.l, but 
which at the same time render him incap-
able of sound and calm judgement. All of 
us who have acted under conditions of 
emotional stress know how foolish our 
actions appeared when seen :in retrospect. 
Certa>in criminal offlences are commiltted 
under the stress of emotional tension 
when forces are unleashed which under 
normal conditions are inhibited or at least 
damped down. Thanks to Freud even the 
man in the street now knows that we often 
act for reasons which wo do not under-
stand. Persons with hysterical personaJlli-
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ties are particularly prone to these twilight 
states (when they are apt to go on a fugue, 
in a state of dissociation) when their 
behaviour becomes dominated by uncon-
scious forces but cannot in all fCl!irness be 
said to satisfy the legaJl tests of insanity 
even if we were to butcher the facts to fit 
the theory. 
OnE;! other concept in which criminal 
law and modern psychiatrIc thinking have 
drifted apart is that contamed in the 
theorY of dist'inct faculties of the mind 
functioning independently. This is appar-
emly derived from the theory of phreno-
logy when it was oelieved that each func-
tion of the mind had 1ts own wa.ter tight 
compartment in the brain with its respec-
tive bump on the skull. One still hears 
talk in legal ciroles of paltial delusion or 
partial insanity or monomania. In psy-
chiatry we do not recognise such condi-
tions. The mind works as a whole and a 
delus:on is a symptom of a disease affeoting 
all aspects of mental life. We cannot 
divorce cogn1tion from affection and cona-
tion as the McNaughten mles would ha've 
us do. The idea that part of the mind can 
be diseased whHe the rest 1S completely 
normal is pure legal fiction. A mental, ill-
ness interferes with the patient's thought, 
feeling and conduct, and brings about a 
breakdown in the harmonious psychologi-
calconnections ,(nd a disorganization of 
the personality as a whole. Intellect, feel-
ing and striving are constantly interacting 
between themselves and the enVlroment to 
produce the behav:iour we kno,w and, in our 
assessment of this behaviour we must 
take stock of all this interaction. A mother, 
who in the abyss of a me[ancholic illness 
kills her new born baby, knows what she 
is doing and that it is against the la,w to 
do so' but her thoughts and her judgement 
are influenced by the outlook of hopeless-
ness and despair which a severe depres-
sion brings into her menta·l life. In fact 
Sec 258A of the Maltese Criminal Code 
changes such a crime from one of wilful 
homicide to one of 'infanticide liaJJe to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 
years. This section conforms to the doc-
trine of diminished responsihility of many 
continental countries and accepts a degree 
of mental disorder which comes between 
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sanity and insanity. The law :is apparentily 
recognizing what has been accepted teach-
ing in psychiatry for a long time now. But 
this recognition is apparently limited in 
MaLta ito cases of infanticide only, The doc-
trine of diminished responsibiHty has not 
received general acceptance in the Maltese 
criminal code notwithstanding that a pro-
posal for the introduction of limited res-
ponsibility was twice made in the Council 
of Government first by Sir Adrian Dingli 
in 1850 and then by Sir Arthur Mercieca 
in 1909. 
Pleading and court procedure 
From the somewhat academic con-
cepts of insanitty atl'aw I would now like to 
pass on to the more practical considera-
tions of the medico-legal pro,cedures 
involved in criminal trials where the plea 
of insanity is raised. 
In Malta this plea can be raised either 
by the prosecution or by the defence and 
in cases where the plea is supported, the 
Court sends the accused for a period 
of observation art Mount Carmel Hospital 
and appoints one or more medical experts, 
(usually three), to submit a written repon: 
on the mental state of the accused during 
the time of the a!lleged offence and during 
the triall. In the case of Rex vs Giuseppe 
Cauchi determined on 24th September, 
1942, rules were given by the Court for the 
guidance of medical experts where the 
issue of insanity was referred to them. One 
of the recommendations made by the Court 
states that "A regular proces verbal of 
the interrogatory of the patient, when 
made ay the experts, should be kept and 
filed together with the report." In an 
explanatory note on this rule Judge Hard-
ing states: "It would appear that the result 
of the interrogatory is a very important 
consideraion in guiding the experts to their 
conclusions. It seems proper that some 
sort of control be made possible by the 
keeping of a proces verbal and the ,filing 
thereof with the report." 
This rule runsl counter to ordinary 
psychiatric practice of history taking and 
psychiatric examina,tion in which the 
patent submits information willingly in an 
atmosphere of trust and confidence in his 
physician. In examining a Court patient 
the psychiatrist is concerned solely with 
arrivmg at a fair opinion of the accused's 
state of mind at the time of the alleged 
crime and at the time of the trial. He is 
not concerned with determining mnocence 
or guilt. But if this rule were to be strictly 
applied one would have to warn the 
accused that anything he says would have 
to be filed in the report to the Court. This 
would very likely give rise to an atmos-
phere of suspicion and mistrust which in 
the case of a patient wHh paranoid trends 
would often end up compe:~tHng him to 
remain mute .and unresponsive. In orcfinary 
psychiatric practice one is already handi-
capped by the problem of establishing 
rapport with some patients. But how can 
you communicate meaningfully with some-
one who sees you as part of the oppressing 
establ,ishment when you warn him that 
anything he says may be repeated in 
Court? 
As the psychiatric interview is essen-
tial for a psychiatric referee to form a 
sound opinion of a person's mental condi-
tion and as this cannot be had if the 
patient refuses to talk, it would appear 
that if this rule is insisted upon it is likely 
to defeat its own ends. There are, of 
course, other considerations emanating 
from the defendant's constitutional pri-
vilege not to be a witness against himself. 
It seems that the objections to th:s rule of 
procedure have not so far been given their 
due weight. 
In accordance with present laws of 
criminal procedure applicaJ.le in Malta as 
in many other countries, any allegation of 
insanity shaH first be deltermined by a jury 
whose members are not bound to accept 
the findings of the referees. This raises a 
point of principle of great importance 
and one which appears to be at variance 
with the principles of expert evidence 
applicable to medical or surgical cases. 
No COurit of law would accept the testimony 
of a group of laymen as to whether a person 
was affected with heart disease, tubercu-
losis or cancer. Why therefore shou~d 
there be a different rule regarding mental 
disorders? Why indeed are laymen with no 
special knowledge or experience of mental 
illness ever qualified to express an opinion 
on the sanity or insanity of another per-
son? How, may one ask, can nine men 
selected at random be assumed to be cap-
able of conceiving the intricate elements 
of psychiatric disorder and form an 
op~nion, based on one fact without having 
examined or observed the patient for any 
Imgth of time? Insanity, whether in law 
or in psychIatry is a condition of the mind 
and not a mere lack of self control; it can-
not be recogn:sed from anyone act how-
ever atrocious, antisocia~ or impulsive it 
happens to be. The process of establishing 
a clin:cal diagnosis of insanity is similar 
to that of constructing the picture of a 
jig-saw puzzle. The pieces acquire meaning 
only if they fit together into a coherent 
whole, -:ut one piece by itself is absolutely 
meaningless. 
With this situation we have to consider 
not only the risks involved in condemning 
a sick man but also the risk of sending a 
sane p::;rson to pass the rest of his life with-
in the strict custody imposed on insane 
offenders. This is as terrible a punishment 
as any known in the annals of the martyr-
dom of man. As one author mild::y puts it 
"To have a sane man found insane ma,y be 
a forensic triumph but it has little else to 
commend it." To my mind such a finding 
would impose a change in the role of the 
hospital from one of care and treatment to 
one of custody and detention and a change 
in the role of its staff from one of doctors 
and nurses to that of white coated jailers. 
These remarks are meant to high-
Hght the difficulties of the jury verdict of 
sanity or insanity and the heavy responsi-
bility whIch lies with their decision. It has 
to be admitted however that although the 
system may at times fail to attain the good 
intentions of the legis,lator no better 
alternative is yet in sight. The ,last word 
on the question of criminal responsibility 
must rest with the law. 
I\fethods of disposall 
From convlctIOn we now pass on to 
sentencing and it is here that cooperation 
between law and medicine is most impor-
tant. Unfortunately in Malta this is the 
arsa in which we lag far behind other 
countries. The most serious weakness in 
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our system is in my opmIOn, the lack oi 
flexibility in the disposal of the accused 
found to be insane. This disposal is 
prescribed in Sec 619 of the Maltese 
CrIminal Code where it is stated that if the 
accused is found to be insane the Court 
shall order the accused to be kept in strict 
custody in Mount Carmel Hospita,l and 
shall cause information thereof to be forth-
with conveyed to the Governor who will 
give such directions as he may deem fit for 
the care and custody of such insane 
person. 
In practice this amounts very often to 
an indeterminate sentence and is applicaJ1e 
not only to major crimes but also to minor 
offences; so that if insane behaviour finds 
expression in petty thefts or in taking 
unauthorized joy rides or in any other form 
of minor delinquency the offender may be 
sent to hospital for the same ll1definite 
period as in the case of the patient who 
has maimed or killed. There is apparently 
no provision in our legislation to, enable 
the judge or magistrate to obtain the 
experts' opinion on the most appropriate 
psychiatric disposaL Neither is there any 
provision to ascertain that facilities for 
treatment are a,vailable or that the concJ.:i-
ion from which the accused is suffering is 
susceptible to medical treatment or should 
better be dealt with within the perial 
sysem. In my experience once the jury's 
verd'ict of insanity is given the accused js 
invariably dealt with in accordance with 
Sec. 619. 
In many developed countries with pro-
gressive mental health legislation a num-
ber of possibiliHes are open to the court 
after sentencing. In England for example, 
according to the Court's assessment of the 
case, an abnormal offender may be dealt 
with in several ways: 
1) As in Malta he may be compul-
sorily admit,ted to hospital with a restric-
tion order on discharge - detention being 
for an indefinite perIod unless overruled 
=y the Secretary of State; 
2) He may be compulsorily admitted 
to hospitall Without any restriction on dis-
charge - dis.charge is determined by the 
responsible medical officer in much the 
same way as that of a cercified patient; 
3) He may be admitted to guardian-
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ship o{ 10latives or others; 
4) He may be put on probation and 
required to undergo treatment; 
5) He may be conditionally or abso-
lutely d~scharged if he agrees to receive 
treatment voluntarily either as in-patient 
or out-patient; 
6) He may be made subject to nor-
mal penal sentence such as imprisonment 
or fine. 
This last pmvIsion may sound harsh 
and unorthodox when applied to abnormal 
o.ffenders but I would like to go back to 
the concept of continuous sCCliles mentioned 
previously and emphasize the fact that 
abnormal o.ffenders cannot be oliassified 
into the two categories of the utterly 
irresponsible and the fully responsi oleo 
Apart from those who suffer from severe 
psychiatric disorders the majority of 
offenders retain some element of respon-
sibility and ahhough medical treatment is 
necessary durIng overtly unstable phases, 
discipline and character trainlng still have 
a role to play. This app1ies particular,liY to. 
severe forms of psychopathic personalities 
whose main symptom is violence in an 
apparently .normal person. They are un-
likely to. benefit by any kind of mental 
hospital treatment because their needs are 
different. Indeed in the conventional 
mental hospital they receive no treatment 
- they are admitted solely for board and 
lodging. they become a nuisance and a 
danger to other patients, monopolize: the 
staff's attention and prevent the deve1lop-
men of therapeutic community attitudes. 
You 0.0 not admit a criminal psychopath 
to a conventionau mental hospital for the 
same reason that yo.U do not admit a patient 
with smallpox to the general hospllal. In 
most countries they are cared for 'lll special 
hospitals or in special units in priso.ns 
kno.wn as priso.n ho.spitals. 
It is because of such considerations 
that measures have been introduced in most 
courts abroad to enable them to obtain 
further information so as to assess whether 
the condition is susceptible to. medical 
treatment or whether the hospital has 
facilities for dealing with serious criminal 
propensities. In the modern menta·1 hospi-
tal where the milieu has been freed from 
the old restrictions, the requirements of 
this type of patient are at variance with 
those of the majority. This being the case, 
it is advisaJ,le in Malta in order not to 
restrict the many because of the needs of 
the few, to provide a special unit in the 
form of a small prison hospital where the 
needs of the criminal patient could be 
adequately met. However, for the courts to 
continue to commit to conventiona.l hospi-
tals such offende'rs whose abnormal be-
haviour constitutes a real threat to other 
patients and staff is unrealistic, to say the 
least. 
I would .Iiike to. conclude with a plea 
to all my legal and medical colleagues not 
to allow my list of shortcomings and criti-
elsms to overshadow my praise and 
admiration for the way in which justice is 
done and is seen to be done in the Maltese 
Courts of Law. 
